I had a discussion with a friend this evening regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. My friend, an establishment Democrat, expressed what can reasonably be described as a centrist pre-9/11 view of the issue. I say pre-9/11 because it's hard to gauge how much the nation has, like me, shifted firmly into the pro-Israel camp. He certainly wishes no harm to Israel and, like most people in the US, wishes both camps to be able to live side-by-side in peace. The discussion was a disappointment in many levels because he, with a generally moderate temperament, has remained... well, with a moderate temperament.

Ordinarily, I would applaud this point of view as I am not generally prone to extremity in any particular direction. Unfortunately, there are times when moderation is insufficient and fair-mindedness gives the advantage to the obstinate. Indeed, there are times when obstinance must be met with obstinance. Israel is one of the clearest cases of this that comes to mind.

However, let's approach this logically and from a neutral standpoint so that we can see if we can find an agreement that is acceptable to both sides.

What my discussion with my friend came down to, and what all discussions will eventually come down to, is whether or not peace is possible and what to do in the apparent absence of its possibility. My friend is of the view that no matter how seemingly impossible peace between the two sides is, we cannot stop striving for it. We cannot accept perpetual violence. My view, as best articulated by another generally apolitical friend, is that we are in a sense obsessed with peace. All things being equal, peace is obviously infinitely better than war. The problem generally arises when peace, or in this case the mere striving for it, leaves one side or the other in worse shape than they would be in if they were at war. To put it another way, there are some things worth fighting for. In this case, it's Israel's right to exist.

To some of the more "fair-minded" observers of the conflict, this is lost. They are missing the trees for the forest and are so wound up in objectivity that they fail to recognize the subjectivity of human nature. Reasonable people can agree to disagree, but it only takes unreasonable party to render the discussion moot. Where the fair-minded see a Venn Diagram where interests overlap, many of us see two entirely separate circles the closest points of which are miles apart.

Within the Israeli circle is the belief that they should exist, where they are, without continued fear of their existence. They do not desire to see the Muslims driven out of the Middle East (how could they?). While they may desire to see an Israel free of any and all Palestinians, they have take actions to make it happen despite having the military resources to do so. This arguably could be because they know that over-zealousness might incur the wrath of neighboring countries or they might simply tolerate the Palestinians because they believe that they are, in their current state, not an inherent threat to the existence of Israel. In either case, we can safely, and even objectively, conclude that will not be driving all of the Palestinians out of Israel.

Within the Palestinian circle is the belief that Israel's existence in the region is illegitimate. Only recently and only in English have they acknowledged that Israel has a right to exist. While this might sound like a starting point, they have done very little, if anything at all, to demonstrate that they are sincere in this belief. Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat's comments in Arabic have been markedly different than his ones in English. Furthermore, when former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians almost everything they wanted, Arafat refused and the Second Infitada began. One might be able to conclude from this that if the Israelis gave the Palestinians everything that they want, violence might possibly cease.

The idea of this occurring is too tempting for the peacemongerers, such as my friend and Tom Friedman of the New York Times, to resist. Indeed, Friedman recently pushed a Saudi Arabian proposal to move to the pre-1967 borders in order for assurances of Israel's security. Israel was skeptical, but Prime Minister Sharon called for a week-long ceasefire as a demonstration of good-will and seriousness. This was, however, too much to ask of Arafat because out of either incompetence or fraud, violence quickly picked up and details of the Saudi proposal, such as the reclaiming of land by the Palestinians outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, left too much to be desired when it came to Sharon's view of what was necessary to protect Israel. This has led to the current state of chaos that has ensued.

So there you have it. In 2000, Barak offered more than what most Israelis were willing to concede and it was rejected by the Palestinians. Barak himself was electorally deposed for his efforts and replaced with someone considerably less diplomatic. In 2002, a plan proposed by Saudi Arabia was rejected by both the Israelis and Palestinians as insufficient. These circles just don't meet. So even leaving aside whose demands are more reasonable, war at this point is inevitable.

"But still," voices cry out, "we must try something. We cannot let the violence and bloodshed continue." Carried with this plea is the implied, but not often expressed and therefore rarely challenged, question of "what harm can there be in trying?"

Again, leaving out the moral implications who is right and wrong, there is procedurally much harm to be done in trying. Israel's actions are, for the most part, a top-down operation. If Sharon orders an attack, it's carried out. If Sharon orders his men to pull back, they do. If they do not, it is within Sharon's power to relieve them of their duties. Sharon, as the head of a state and commander of an army, is held accountable for his actions.

Palestinian actions, on the other hand, are considerably more de-centrilized. The fighters on the Palestinian side are not soldiers in a hierarchal army. They are instead an independent network of agents who take orders from several locations. Therefore, it is possible that even if Arafat is truly a peace-loving individual, he is powerless to stop the actions of Hamas and similar independent entities. Therefore, to the extent that Arafat does want peace, he is incapable and therefore not always accountable for the actions of his people. That means that to effectively create peace, we would not only need the approval of Arafat, but we would also need the approval of the leaders of each and every one of the independent entities that has declared Israel its mortal enemy. In the past, we have generally left it to Arafat to get his people in line and he has been unable, or unwilling, to do so. Indeed, Hamas and Hizbollah have claimed that nothing short of the elimination of Israel would satisfy them.

That, to say the least, is unacceptable to the Israelis. Therefore, by asking Israel to step down and being incapable of making the Palestinians step down, we are creating a strategic environment very favorable to Palestine. So even by trying to be objective and to not take sides, we are de facto taking the side of the Palestinians. It is within our rights to do so if we choose, but we are unable to expect the Israelis to simultaneously accept our opposing position and do as we ask them to.